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The Ethics Teacher's Bittersweet Revenge: Virtue
and Risk Management
WILLIAM

H. SIMoN*

Insurance companies have come to play a role in professional responsibility
compliance that rivals that of courts and disciplinary agencies. The insurers,
however, depart from the judicial perspective of the traditional enforcement
agencies. Instead, they take the risk management perspective that Anthony
Alfieri describes.'
I agree with Alfieri that risk management poses real dangers of cynicism and
Babbittry. Nevertheless, I also see more upside than he does. The new perspective is valuable, not just as a strategy for attracting student attention, but as an
antidote to real and basic deficiencies in mainstream ethics teaching and traditional professional practice. In this Comment, I first suggest why the risk
management perspective arouses deep ambivalence on the part of ethics teachers. I then point to three respects in which risk management has the potential to
make contributions to ethical reflection. In two of these respects, it might
remedy deficiencies in current ethics teaching; in the other, it seems complementary to current ethics teaching.

I.

THE ANXIETY OF

ETHIcs

TEACHING

Alfieri's critique of the risk management perspective on professional responsibility acutely captures a central torment in the life of the legal ethics teacher.
Ethics teachers in professional schools worry about their credibility with their
students. Their students aspire to be practitioners. The teachers do not. They
have given up practice, if they ever pursued it. This means that their knowledge
of the circumstances of practice is limited, and even more importantly, that they
are not subject to pressures to attract and please clients or to satisfy the demands
of law firm superiors. They have renounced the biggest material rewards. Yet,
they have achieved a combination of upper-middle class material comfort and
on-the-job freedom unknown in most quarters of the economy. They get paid, in
part, for taking positions that more often than not have no consequences in the
outside world. Tenure immunizes them from adverse consequences within the
academy.
In this situation, the teacher's defense of more than minimal professional
responsibility standards is likely to sound naive or self-righteous. Most students
know that law schools do not equip them with a broad range of the skills they
will need for practice. At many schools, the students are counting on the large
firm employers for which they expect to work to teach them about practice. By
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1. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94
GEo. L.J. 1909 (2006).
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and large, however, practitioners have been uninterested in professional responsibility. They have routines to check for conflicts, and they are aware of a range
of duties to clients and third parties, but they have not been particularly
self-conscious or reflective about such matters; to a surprising extent they have
been indifferent, if not averse, to open discussion of difficult issues. If practitioners are uninterested in most ethical issues, or unreflective and insensitive to
them, then that strongly suggests to students that the issues are unimportant. In
the world of practice, ambitious thinking about difficult issues seems at worst an
indication of softness and insecurity, at best a kind of intellectual ornamentation.
Yet every now and then, the ethics teacher gets a taste of vindication. This
vindication is most likely to happen in the aftermath of high-profile scandals in
which prominent, sophisticated practitioners have been complicit in outrageous
behavior by their clients. The lawyers are roundly condemned for violating
standards of the sort that the ethics teacher has long espoused. Even better,
people express disgust at the failure of the lawyers even to identify and reflect
on the issues in the manner in which the teacher has been trying to train her
students. And the straying lawyers are often exposed to substantial, tangible
sanctions.
These moments suggest a natural strategy for shoring up the teacher's
pedagogical authority. They provide cautionary tales suggesting that students
have worldly motives to heed the teacher, and they imply that practitioners are
not consistently reliable in their judgments on these matters.
These moments, however, do not endure. They do not seem to work any
major, enduring shift in the relative authority of teachers and practitioners. On
reflection, we can see why. Only a small minority of practitioners comes to grief
in the scandals (and even they succeed sometimes in portraying themselves as
victims of inescapable arbitrariness on the part of enforcers). Moreover, the
students know that the ethics teacher's interest in these matters is not exactly
scientific. Her scandal-derived sample is biased toward situations in which
lawyers get caught. She has little interest in and less information about episodes
in which lawyers who violate her precepts escape sanctions and achieve unmitigated success.
Even to the extent she can appeal to prudence and self-interest effectively, the
ethics teacher is bound to feel ambivalent about this appeal. The ethics teacher
is usually an idealist. She came to the subject to explore and defend an image of
lawyering that she finds intrinsically good. Part of the attraction of ethics for her
is precisely its appeal to a perspective above the grubby struggle for place and
reward. The strategy of prudence seems to compromise these motives. If "loss
prevention" means just losing money and not your ideals, it seems a crass and
unworthy substitute for ethics. So the teacher's revenge proves bittersweet. The
practitioners suffer for their indifference to her efforts. But they interpret their
suffering in ways that ignore key values that motivate these efforts.
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OF RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management has the potential to make three major contributions to
professional responsibility discourse.
First, risk management is worldly.
Ethics teaching tends toward idealism. Idealism is good to the extent that it
encourages us to consider values and possible ways of living them beyond the
ones represented in the most salient patterns of behavior we observe. But when
idealism leads to withdrawal or aloofness from practical affairs, it marginalizes
ethics teaching. Some religious vocations encourage withdrawal as a road to the
ideal, but this is not an option for professionals. They have to live in the world.
Academics have a partial dispensation from worldly pressures, but to the extent
that they indulge their position to ignore or disdain worldly ambitions and
pressures, students are right to question their teachers' understanding of their
needs.
Risk management forces attention to practical consequences of professional
responsibility decisions, at least insofar as consequences are measured by
liability (a limitation I will comment on in a moment). In treating liability as
probabilistic rather than binary and absolute, risk management demands that we
take a more realistic attitude toward the legal system. In demanding that we
measure and balance harms and benefits, this approach improves on a categorical morality that treats all norm violations as comparable.
With its emphasis on self-interest, risk management is an improvement over
an ethical perspective insisting that each discussant treat herself as just one
person among a universe of people with equally valid claims for her consideration. It is an improvement not only because marketing professional responsibility to students with worldly aspirations becomes easier, but also because an
ethic that sees responsibility as an aspect of self-fulfillment is more plausible
and more powerful than one that sees responsibility as a form of self-denial.
The attempt to transcend self-interest often leads to hypocrisy or preachy
irrelevance.
Prior to the 1970s, elite law schools tended not to teach professional responsibility. Many other law schools more often did, often under the rubric of "Law
Office Management." 2 The courses assumed that professional responsibility
issues were embedded in the vocational tasks of constructing and operating a
law practice. Additionally, the courses were oriented mostly to sole and very
small firm practitioners and included technical material on such matters as client
trust accounts at a level of detail that doubtless bored many. They also often
ignored controversial normative questions (for example, cross-examining the
truthful witness) in favor of trite exhortations (such as "do not steal from your
clients"). When ethics became fashionable in the 1970s, the elite schools
developed an approach that was exclusively normative. Courses varied from the

2. See, e.g., KLNE D. STRONG & ARBEN 0. CLARKE, LAw OFFICE MANAGEMENT (1974).
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mundanely doctrinal to the ambitiously speculative, but issues of management
were excluded, apparently as beneath notice. Of course, the small-firm focus of
the "Law Office Management" courses would have been inappropriate for
students headed for big firms, but it would have been possible to develop a
perspective on the organization of practice in big firms. The elite schools did not
do that, however, and the other schools followed their lead, sometimes giving
up their "Law Office Management" courses to adopt the more purely normative
model.
Only recently have we seen the development of a literature on the organization of practice on which a thicker, more organizationally grounded approach
might rest.3 If the risk management perspective could encourage the integration
of this understanding into ethics teaching, it would perform a valuable service.
Second, risk management is collaborative.
Substantively, ethics teachers are altruists who argue for greater concern for
others. But methodologically, they are individualists. They portray ethical decisionmaking as a fundamentally individual affair. Some matters are determined
through legal analysis of rules and authority. Here the assumption is that each
lawyer can apply her technical skills to arrive at the answer. Where authority is
indeterminate, ethicists most commonly call for a choice in terms of personal
value.4 The individual lawyer has to decide in terms of her conscience and her
image of the kind of person she wants to be. The most dramatic variations call
to mind Martin Luther at the Diet of Worms proclaiming, "Here I stand." The
more routine decisions are more private, but no less individual. There is also
another perspective, exemplified by Anthony Kronman's defense of "prudentialism," that sees the lawyer resolving hard issues in terms of open-textured but
public values.5 But again, this is an individual perspective. Kronman's image is
the "lawyer-statesman"-a paragon of sagacity who stands above institutions.6
In contrast, the risk management view is resolutely collaborative. Among the
warning signs or red flags to which risk management draws anxious attention
are these:
There are no shared goals for the firm; no leader has emerged; or worse, you
are a group of partners that refuses to be managed. Your practice management
systems are stand-alone systems (i.e., you don't share calendars, case manage-

3. Milton Regan's case history of John Gellene's criminal prosecution is an outstanding example.
See generally MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT You KnIL: THE FALL OF AWALL STREEr LAWYER (2004).

4. For example, David Luban's classic defense of "moral activism" speaks of ethical decisionmaking
in consistently individual terms. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE: AN ETmcAL STUDY XXii,
160-61, 170-74, 210, 237-38 (1988).
5. See ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILNG IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 219-25
(1993).
6. See id. at 15.
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ment, conflicts systems or trust accounts). Every lawyer does what she wants
to do; there is no accountability to others in the firm.
Risk managers hate "eat-what-you-kill" compensation systems because they
give individual lawyers much stronger incentives to please their own clients
than to protect the firm's collective material and reputational interests.8 To
address this concern, one anonymous liability insurance executive recommends
that its firms institute a "lone wolf' detection system that targets for quarterly
review each case in the firm on which only a single lawyer has billed time.
The risk management perspective points to an ambiguity in Milton Regan's
extraordinary account of the John Gellene case, in which a Milbank Tweed
bankruptcy partner was convicted of perjury for failing to disclose the firm's
relationship with a creditor that might have prompted conflict objections to its
representation of the debtor. On the one hand, Regan portrays the problem as an
organizational failure. Gellene was the classic "lone wolf."' He was a solitary
operator, given to ignoring firm rules (and even Bar rules) in accordance with
his own judgment of their importance and legitimacy. He tended to work on his
own schedule, often without assistance.1 o He made critical professional responsibility decisions, including the ones that led to his perjury conviction, in private
without discussing the issues with his partners." In Regan's view, firms tend to
attract and engender lone wolves by embracing the "tournament culture" associated with up-or-out, promotion-to-partner practices. 12 High-risk, high-reward
structures and fierce competition encourage aggressive, risky attitudes toward
compliance. And the loose, virtually anarchic organization of the traditional
firm leaves the organization vulnerable to such behavior. Much of the book
reads like a cautionary tale about the importance of risk management.1 3
But the book has another theme-the market, and more specifically, the
commercialization of practice in increasingly competitive service and labor

7. Suzanne Rose, Risk Management: Is the Culture of Your Firm Inviting Malpractice or Ethics
Violations?, 41 TENN. B.J. 22, 22-23 (2005); see also Anthony Davis, The Long-Term Implications of
the Kaye Scholer Casefor Law Firm Risk Management-RiskManagement Comes of Age, 35 S. 'Ix.

L. REv. 677, 680-81 (1994) (discussing large firm lawyers' independence and the liability issues arising
from this arrangement).
8. See Rose, supra note 7, at 23-24 (noting how this type of compensation system endangers a firm's
overall work product and exposes it to liability by rewarding personal performance over business
development).
9. REGAN, supra note 3, at 193.

10. Id. at 199, 345.
11. See id. at 214-15, 260-61, 297.
12. Id. at 304-05.
13. Regan speculates that, had the relevant decisions been made collectively within the firm's
bankruptcy practice group, they might not have come out differently because the other lawyers in the
group shared Gellene's incentives and biases. Id. at 348. This could be true, but it is not obviously so.
Sometimes forcing articulation and deliberation can make a difference, even among like-minded peers.
But even conceding the point, it goes to the optimal shape of risk management, not its basic desirability.
Monitoring procedures should ensure that lawyers are reviewed by people from outside their practice
field.
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markets.' 4 Firms have to hustle for clients; and they have to struggle to recruit
and retain lawyers. The American Lawyer mercilessly measures and discloses
the relative performance of firms in terms of "profits per partner."15 Regan
suggests that competitive pressures induce lawyers to cut corners and push the
limits of ethical and legal constraints.' 6 (This, of course, was once a central
rationale of the bar for constraining competition in the market for legal services.)
Yet, it seems unlikely that the quest to maximize income-Regan's second
theme-is compatible with the risks and the centrifugal tendencies of anarchic
organization-his first theme. Successful firms by definition have collective
assets, and anarchic organization exposes these assets to severe and unnecessary
risk. The liability and reputational risks in the lawyer conduct in many recent
scandals seem far out of proportion to any plausibly expected gain to the firm. It
often appears that part of the problem is a misalignment of firm incentives and
individual incentives. A competitive market ought to generate pressure for more
collaborative organization. This intuition seems confirmed by the fact that
insurers are successfully pressing firms to change in this direction. If the market
was once part of the problem, it now seems to be part of the cure.1
Third, like ethics teaching, risk management encourages clear articulationof
ethical decisions.
There has been a powerful tendency in the profession to defer explicit
confrontation with difficult issues. At the institutional level, we see this proclivity in the profession's failure to address key issues regarding the responsibility
of lawyers in salient financial scandals. We also see it in the failure of doctrine
to address the distinctive features of organizational, as opposed to individual,
representation until more than a century after the advent of modem corporate
practice, and in the deliberate ambiguity of doctrine after the promulgation of
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13.18 At the individual level, we see it in
stories like Regan's Eat What You Kill, which show prominent lawyers making
critical decisions on high stakes issues with little or no reflection or discussion.19
14. See id. at 32-36. For a single-minded development of this theme, see Patrick J. Schiltz, On
Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52
VAmD. L. REv. 871, 888-89, 903, 912-16 (1999).
15. See, e.g., 2005 Profits Per Partner, AM. LAW., May 2006, at 165.

16. REGA, supra note 3, at 358.
17. Collaboration can take oppressive forms as well as empowering ones. The collaborative situation
most likely to be considered in traditional ethics courses is the one in which a junior lawyer is asked by
a superior to do something she believes to be wrong. There is no guarantee that the move from
individualism to collaboration will be progressive, but other features of the risk management approach
are responsive to the danger. For example, peer review processes, confidential internal grievance
procedures, and demand for transparency on the part of all decisionmakers impose accountability on
superiors as well as subordinates.
18. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.13 (1980) (on the "Organization as Client").

19. See REGAN, supra note 3, at 323 (discussing Gellene's failure to reflect on or discuss critical
decision); see also William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candorand the
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Part of the explanation for this tendency seems psychological. Hard ethical
issues are stressful because they typically involve conflicts within the firm or
between the firm and its clients. Closing one's eyes to them alleviates tension.
Moreover, there seems to be a fear that explicit consideration and decisionmaking on such issues will commit the actors to positions that may turn out to be
wrong. Deferring consideration seems to preserve flexibility for post hoc rationalization. Still another factor in some quarters is a culture of macho toughness
that identifies ethical concerns with weakness.20
Ethics teachers, of course, deplore this tendency. They encourage their students to articulate their reasoning on hard issues as clearly as they can. In this,
they have an ally in risk management. A central tendency of the managerial
philosophy that underlies risk management is the value of articulation. "Say
what you do and do what you say" is a fundamental maxim of this philosophy. 2 1
Articulation is valued in part because it induces reflection by the person who
articulates, in part because it induces transparency so that co-workers can assess
and deliberate about each other's performances, and in part because it helps
people learn from each other. If a central tenet of the most ambitious forms of
ethical idealism is that only the examined life is worth living, then the ethical
idealist will find something to approve of in risk management.
To be sure, as Alfieri emphasizes, the examination contemplated by risk
management sounds much less ambitious than the one contemplated by moral
philosophy. 2 2 Avoiding liability is a very small part of the ambitions the moral
philosopher associates with the good life. But even if the adoption of these
systems is prompted by pecuniary concerns, there is no reason why they cannot
range more broadly. Law firms these days typically perceive other basic problems beside loss prevention. Many firms are struggling over issues of management structure and compensation. Many are having trouble recruiting and
retaining associates. And while they may not be seen as comparably urgent,
issues of race and gender diversity, pro bono commitment, and work-family
balance are also on the agenda. Managerial efforts to address liability concerns
will very likely overlap efforts to address these other issues. If the prescription
Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 243, 259-67 (1998) (documenting

the Bar's evasion of key issues raised by the banking regulators' charges against Kaye Scholer in the
Lincoln Savings & Loan case); William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Accountability: Lawyer
Responsibilityfor Collective Misconduct, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 17-20, 29-34 (2005) (arguing that the

Bar's norms on corporate representation have been deliberately ambiguous).
20. See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 101-61 (1998)
(arguing that fear of commitment and a culture of toughness inhibit explicit consideration of ethical
issues); Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of CorporateSecurities Lawyering: Biases, Organization, and Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 647-55 (1997) (arguing that stress-driven psychological

processes lead lawyers to ignore or misperceive ethical issues).
21. THE ISO 14000 HANDBOOK 196 (Joseph Cascio ed., 1996). For a discussion of this and related
themes, see generally William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule
Regimes, in LAW AND NEw GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 37-64 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne

Scott eds., 2006).
22. See generally Alfieri, supra note 1.
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to self-consciously articulate and periodically reevaluate goals and policies to
achieve them takes hold across any of these domains, it would not be surprising
if it spread to the others. The ethics teacher ought to greet that prospect with at
least qualified optimism.

